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Wednesday, December 9, 2015

More Views of the World from Trump Tower: New York’s South Bronx Legacy follows thick and fast on Jersey City Juxtaposition

londonWeb

View of London from Trump Tower: Can you find the police no-go areas? Hint: Try using a relativistic space-time drone!

The New York Times reports today that Republican presidential frontrunner Donald Trump has again doubled down after his modestly provocative proposal to ban Muslims from entering the US, with more controversial contentions:

“Paris is no longer the same city it was,” he said, before adding, without citing any evidence: “They have sections in Paris that are radicalized where the police refuse to go there. They’re petrified. The police refuse to go in there. We have places in London and other places that are so radicalized that the police are afraid for their own lives.”

Mr. Trump’s statement about Paris has no basis in fact: There are no districts there or outside Paris where the police have said they are unwilling to go. The mayor of London, Boris Johnson, meanwhile, said that Mr. Trump’s claim about his city was “complete and utter nonsense.” Saying crime was falling in London and New York, he added: “The only reason I wouldn’t go to some parts of New York is the real risk of meeting Donald Trump.”

Is The Donald once again confusing distant geographical locations and historical periods with places closer to home, such as the South Bronx and the Lower East Side during his formative years in the 1970s? This time he cannot plead diminished responsibility due to his Alliterative Memory Disorder.

Lower East Side burning garbage

South Bronx FireWas New York’s Lower East Side during the 1970s the police no-go area Donald Trump actually had in mind (left)? Or the South Bronx, where firemen were routinely greeted with bricks and garbage (right)? (Photographs: New York Daily News Archive/Getty Images, Alain Le Garsmeur/Getty Images, both via The Guardian)

Wednesday, November 25, 2015

View of the World from Trump Tower (with Apologies to Saul Steinberg): Alliterative Memory Disorder (AMD) for President, Anyone?

Steinberg 911
View of the world from Trump Tower on Sept. 11, 2001. East Jerusalem is now located just over the Hudson River in an alliterative New Jersey, and thus is easily confused with Jersey City.

Republican frontrunner presidential candidate Donald Trump (“The Donald”) has doubled down on his claim that he saw TV news video of “thousands” of American Arabs/Muslims celebrating in the streets of Jersey City after the 9/11 attack brought down the Twin Towers:

“It did happen. I saw it. It was on television. I saw it. There were people that were cheering on the other side of New Jersey, where you have large Arab populations. They were cheering as the World Trade Center came down.” ABC’s “This Week”, Nov. 22

Until now, no one has turned up any TV footage substantiating this claim, although fellow candidate Ben Carson also recalls seeing it (see FactCheck.org’s 24 Nov. debunking of these claims).

However, US TV news did broadcast video footage of Palestinians in East Jerusalem apparently celebrating the 9/11 attack (although not “thousands”):

While it now seems clear that The Donald could not have seen TV video on 9/11 of Muslims celebrating in the streets of Jersey City, it is highly likely that he was watching CNN or Fox News (I’ll bet on the latter) and saw these reports, which were frequently recycled throughout the day.

Could it be that The Donald is suffering from Alliterative Memory Disorder (AMD)—confounding two cities halfway around the world because they begin with the same consonant (Jersey City and Jerusalem)?

Psychologists have long been aware that alliteration can be an aid to memory, but only now have they discovered that particularly susceptible individuals can be subject to the reverse effect: false memories derived from confusing two trigger words that begin with the same consonant. This is a particularly insidious instance of False Memory Syndrome:

False memory syndrome is a condition in which a person's identity and interpersonal relationships center on a memory of a traumatic experience that is objectively false but that the person strongly believes. Note that the syndrome is not characterized by false memories as such. We all have inaccurate memories. Rather, the syndrome is diagnosed when the memory is so deeply ingrained that it orients the individual's entire personality and lifestyle—disrupting other adaptive behavior. False memory syndrome is destructive because the person assiduously avoids confronting evidence that challenges the memory. Thus it takes on a life of its own; the memory becomes encapsulated and resistant to correction. Subjects may focus so strongly on the memory that it effectively distracts them from coping with real problems in their life. [Wikipedia, following PR McHugh,  2008, Try to remember: Psychiatry's clash over meaning, memory and mind. New York: Dana Press. pp. 66–7]

Do we really want to elect someone to the US presidency suffering from Alliterative Memory Disorder (take your pick of The Donald or Ben Carson) who, in the heat of battle against ISIS, for example, might accidently bomb Rochester, New York, instead of Raqqa, Syria, because they both start with an R?

Rochester  Raqqa Daily Mail

What do Rochester, New York (left) and Raqqa, Syria (right) have in common? Hint: Try to Recall people dancing in the streets. They might be easy to confuse from a drone if you suffered from Alliterative Memory Disorder.

Thursday, September 17, 2015

Is Schumpeter Still a Useful Guiding Light for Global Innovation and Growth Research? Lipari Summer School Lecture

image     Joseph_Schumpeter_ekonomialaria (1)

Marina Corta in Lipari Town (left, my photo) and Joseph Schumpeter (right, Wikimedia).

Recuperating from the very stimulating Growthcom Summer School on Lipari Island (Socio-Economic Complex Systems).

You can download my presentation on “Is Schumpeter Still a Useful Guiding Light for Global Innovation and Growth Research?”

Thursday, August 13, 2015

“The Greek government is to surrender powers over vast areas of economic and social policymaking to its eurozone creditors”

Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-164-0389-23A,_Athen,_Hissen_der_EUflagge

The Guardian last night leaks details of the third Greek bailout agreement:

The Greek government is to surrender powers over vast areas of economic and social policymaking to its eurozone creditors under draconian terms agreed for a new three-year bailout.

The 29 pages of conditions concede ultimate authority over much of Greek policymaking to the eurozone and establish a system of quarterly reviews of the reforms by the troika of institutions – the European commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – representing the creditors…

The document states: “No unilateral fiscal or other policy actions will be taken by the [Greek] authorities. All measures, legislative or otherwise, taken during the programme period, which may have an impact on banks’ operations, solvency, liquidity or asset quality should be taken in close consultation [with the troika].”

According to the document, external consultants are to be sent in to advise Greece’s national bank on bad debts and asset management, while the board of the Greek authority dealing with banking revival is to be co-appointed by the troika to counter suspected cronyism and “political interference”…

The European commission, which negotiated the new deal over the past fortnight in Athens alongside the ECB, IMF and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) – the EU bailout fund – is keen to combat German-led scepticism over the package and see it implemented swiftly for fear of a political backlash in Greece.

Tuesday, July 28, 2015

What’s sauce for the goose… Plan Z vs. Plan B (Sketches in European Solidarity V)

There’s a ruckus about the latest disclosure of a contingency Plan B during the Greek debt showdown by the Greek Finance Ministry under its flamboyant minister Yanis Varoufakis to introduce a parallel currency in the event that the ECB shut down Greek banks (which of course the latter did but the former did not). While there is some room for debate about whether the Ministry’s hacking into its own online tax system (who knew backward Greece had an online tax system!), which seems to have been under the control of the troika rather than the ministry itself, seems somewhat stealthy, Paul Krugman defends the existence of such a contingency plan, tongue-in-cheek, as “shocking, shocking!”

Casablanca-Strasser

Who knew that the Greek online tax system was under the control of the troika and not the Greek finance ministry? Film still from Casablanca: Major Strasser (Conrad Veidt) dictating terms to Capt. Renault (Claude Rains). Shocking, shocking!

Quite apart from the fact that this contingency planning had already been initiated by the predecessor Samaras government and revealed by Varoufakis on July 14 in an interview with Phillip Adams, it has long been known that the troika, for its part, had made highly secret contingency plans for Grexit and the introduction of a parallel currency during the 2012 round of the Greek crisis, known as Plan Z.

Here’s an excerpt from Peter Spiegel’s 2014 account in the FT:

Unbeknown to almost the entire Greek political establishment, however, a small group of EU and International Monetary Fund officials had been working clandestinely for months preparing for a collapse of Greece’s banks. Their secret blueprint, known as “Plan Z”, was a detailed script of how to reconstruct Greece’s economic and financial infrastructure if it were to leave the euro.

The plan was drawn up by about two dozen officials in small teams at the European Commission in Brussels, the European Central Bank in Frankfurt and the IMF in Washington. Officials who worked on the previously undisclosed plan insisted it was not a road map to force Greece out of the euro – quite the opposite. “Grexit”, they feared, would wreak havoc in European financial markets, causing bank runs in other teetering eurozone economies and raising questions of which country would be forced out next.

But by early 2012, many of those same officials believed it was irresponsible not to prepare for a Greek exit. “We always said: it’s our aim to keep them inside,” said one participant. “Is the probability zero that they leave? No. If you are on the board of a company and you only have a 10 per cent probability for such an event, you prepare yourself.”

Sounds familiar?

Here at Meltdown Economics we say,

“What’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander!”

Sauce for the gander

File under: Eurozone Barnyard Metaphors (see Game of Chicken, Game of Turkey, Cow on the Ice)

Sunday, July 19, 2015

‘O Freunde, nicht diese Töne’ or ‘Die Schonzeit ist vorbei’: World public opinion at a dangerous crossroads

The official European Union Anthem is the final choral movement of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, based on Schiller’s poem ‘An die Freude’ (‘Ode to Joy’, although the original version apparently had ‘freedom’ instead of ‘joy,’ which Schiller later deleted as too hot a political potato for his day).

Beethoven starts the movement with these words of his own:

O Freunde, nicht diese Töne!
Sondern laßt uns angenehmere anstimmen,
und freudenvollere.
Oh friends, not these sounds!
Let us instead strike up more pleasing
and more joyful ones!

After the Eurozone’s marathon reenactment of Buñuel’s film The Exterminating Angel, the Brussels Crucifixion of Greek PM Alexis Tsipras, and the Guns of Navarone, political discourse around the world has taken a sharp turn in the direction of recrimination, vituperation, polarization, slander and hysteria. On the one hand we have the Twitter hasttag #Thisisacoup denouncing the third Greek bailout terms, on the other we have a touchy nationalistic pushback in establishment German circles, media, and public opinion, as reported for instance in Jacob Soll’s recent NYT op-ed (also see previous post). And European Council president Donald Tusk “had been unsettled by the bitter recriminations that have characterised the contentious six-month Greek negotiations, particularly the anti-EU and anti-German sentiment that he believes has become part of mainstream political discourse,” reports the Financial Times.

On July 12, Paul Krugman in his NYT blog came out strongly in support of the #Thisisacoup camp:

This goes beyond harsh into pure vindictiveness, complete destruction of national sovereignty, and no hope of relief…

Who will ever trust Germany’s good intentions after this? …

The European project — a project I have always praised and supported — has just been dealt a terrible, perhaps fatal blow. And whatever you think of Syriza, or Greece, it wasn’t the Greeks who did it.

Official German circles and their lackeys (I hate to use such a loaded word from communist propaganda days, but it really seems appropriate) did not waste any time in riposting with a character assassination, by Nikolaus Piper in the Süddeutsche Zeitung on July 13. Under the section link “Paul Krugman--Economist foaming at the mouth,” Piper describes Krugman as joining the hashtag campaign of “Germany haters” (Germany being only one of his many pet targets, but currently his favorite), a “hyper-Keynesian” who thinks that new debt, low interest rates and government spending are always the answer to all problems, and that austerity is always false. He insinuates that Krugman’s Nobel Prize for his work in trade theory (actually trade and economic geography) is a questionable qualification for him to pontificate about fiscal (actually macroeconomic) policy while he blithely ignores facts, but Piper fails to mention Krugman’s work on exchange rates and currency crises and his publications on macro policy in a liquidity trap (e.g., Japan in the 90s) and, indeed, bailouts vs. write-downs. He ends with a recital of obscure Baltic politicians and playwrights with even lesser economic qualifications who have also felt an urgent need to defame Krugman. In other words, this is a complete hatchet job based on willful ignorance of the background of someone eminently qualified to comment on the Greek debt crisis (whether you agree with him or not), certainly light-years more qualified than Piper himself (who we are told on his SZ profile has written an award-winning children’s book on economics, among other things). The only invectives missing are “Keynesian running dog” and, of course, “spearhead of the world Jewish conspiracy against Germany,” but then, the Süddeutsche Zeitung is an honorable newspaper and has a reputation to uphold as a liberal paper of record that even republishes excerpts from the New York Times once a week. Strangely enough, the very same Nikolaus Piper conducted a rather favorable interview with Krugman in 2010, praising (if somewhat tongue-in-cheek) the very hang to polemic he now so roundly denounces in him. Is he not only a lackey of the German finance ministry but also suffering from unrequited love?

Piper 15 Krugman porträt SZ screenshot highlighted

Is the hitherto respectable Süddeutsche Zeitung in danger of becoming the new Der Stürmer?

Now, anyone who follows Krugman’s blog and columns knows that he is

That Piper might be part of an orchestrated campaign here (presumably by the German finance ministry, but of course I’m just speculating), comes out in Friday’s interview with German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble in Der Spiegel:

SPIEGEL: The American economist Paul Krugman has a clear position on that. The new aid program for Greece, he wrote in a recent column [actually in his blog, GS] in the New York Times, is "pure vindictiveness" and a "complete destruction of national sovereignty." Do you share his view?

Schäuble: Krugman is a prominent economist who won a Nobel Prize for his trade theory. But he has no idea about the architecture and foundation of the European currency union. In contrast to the United States, there is no central government in Europe and all 19 members of the euro zone must come to an agreement. It appears Mr. Krugman is unaware of that.

Schäuble thus repeats Piper’s mischaracterization of  Krugman’s Nobel award and the insinuation that he is not qualified to judge these issues. Whether Piper is reading from Schäuble’s playbook, or vice versa, is hard to say, but this cannot be a coincidence. Would Schäuble’s perusing Krugman’s seminal 1988 paper “Financing vs. Forgiving a Debt Overhang” (Journal of Development Economics 29: 253-268) change his opinion about Krugman’s qualifications to comment on the Greek debt crisis in any way (on the unlikely assumption that Dr. Schäuble could even make heads or tails of it)?

And that Krugman might be oblivious of the cumbersome governance structure of the Eurozone also seems highly unlikely, besides being largely irrelevant. After all, who in the world today isn’t painfully aware of this deficiency after being subjugated to this excruciating five-year reenactment of The Exterminating Angel?

But we needn't take the word of a benighted American to judge whether there isn’t some justification in the #Thisisacoup accusations. Paul De Grauwe, former member of the Belgian Parliament, emeritus professor at the Catholic University of Leuven, currently professor at the London School of Economics, and one of the world’s leading experts on currency zones, is someone no-one could accuse of being unacquainted with the Eurozone’s architecture (or being a foaming-at-the-mouth “hyper-Keynesian,” for that matter). Yet in his blog on June 17, two weeks before the Guns of Navarone were fired or #Thisisacoup took off, he wrote:

All this teaches us two lessons. First, the objectives of the creditor nations, including the ECB, that today add tough conditions for their liquidity support is not to make Greece solvent but to punish it for misbehavior. … But it is precisely the desire to punish Greece by imposing additional austerity that makes it so difficult for Greece to start growing again and to extricate itself from the bad equilibrium.

A second lesson concerns the credibility of the future use of OMT. It clearly appears from the Greek experience that the willingness of the ECB to use the OMT program is very circumscribed. It is circumscribed by the ECB’s desire to solve a moral hazard problem … Behind the gloves of OMT is hidden a big stick. It is doubtful that future governments that experience payment difficulties will accept to be beaten up first before they can enjoy the OMT liquidity support. [my emphases]

Thus De Grauwe only lends further support to Krugman’s “this goes beyond harsh into pure vindictiveness, complete destruction of national sovereignty, and no hope of relief” critique, well before one could even speak of a “coup.”

Why is the German finance minister so sensitive to these criticisms that he seems almost overeager to resurrect the role of the “ugly German” (in the words of one German opposition parliamentarian)? The Oxford macroeconomist Simon Wren-Lewis has a plausible answer (and it’s not that Dr. Schäuble is a covert Nazi or auditioning for the role of Dr. Strangelove):

What is driving Germany’s desperate need to rid itself of the Greek problem?

One possible answer is that Germany finds the truth about Greece too upsetting, too challenging. This is because since 2010 Greece has done most of what the Troika asked of it. In particular, changes in its government’s underlying primary budget balance (i.e. the degree of austerity enacted) have been greater, by a long distance, than any other European economy. For many outside Germany what has happened to Greece as a result is hardly surprising: austerity is contractionary, and austerity on steroids is ruinous. Yet Germany is a country where the ideas of Keynes, and therefore mainstream macroeconomics in the rest of the world, are considered profoundly wrong and are described as ‘Anglo-Saxon economics’. Greece then becomes a kind of experiment to see which is right: the German view, or ‘Anglo-Saxon economics’.

The results of the experiment are not to Germany’s liking. Just as ‘Anglo-Saxon economics’ would have predicted, the results for Greece under the Troika have been a disaster. After dutifully taking the medicine for years, and seeing the collapse of their economy, finally the Greek people could take no more. Confronting this reality has been too much for Germany. So instead it has created its fantasy, a fantasy that allows it to cast its failed experiment to one side, blaming the character of the patient.

Wren-Lewis fails to mention that the Merkel government is also being very much driven, like the Sorcerer’s Apprentice, by the public opinion it whipped up in the past about “those lazy Greeks,” and by the rise of Germany’s own anti-Euro and xenophobic movements like Alternative für Deutschland and Pegida.

Paul Krugman, as the most visible, vocal and dangerous (what with his flashy Nobel Prize) exponent of this ‘Anglo-Saxon economics’ (read ‘hyper-Keynesianism’), is the obvious policy-wonk Prügelknabe (read ‘whipping boy’) for so many reasons I cannot even begin to enumerate them here. One is perfectly within one’s rights to disagree with him, but then one should marshal legitimate arguments rather than revert to a sorry tradition of character assassination and defamation.

PS: You might be wondering what ‘Die Schonzeit ist vorbei’ is doing in the title of this post. I hesitated to use this very loaded German expression in this context, but will go out on a limb anyway. ‘Die Schonzeit ist vorbei’ (literal translation: ‘the no-hunting-season is over’, or more figuratively, ‘the hunting season has now been reopened’) is an expression attributed to the Frankfurt theater manager Günther Rühle to justify the 1986 staging of film and drama enfant terrible Rainer Werner Fassbinder’s play “Der Müll, die Stadt und der Tod” (although German courts later ruled that it would be inadmissible to attribute it to him, but then, we know how consistently German courts have ruled on touchy historical issues). The Jewish community in Frankfurt claimed that the play revived classical anti-Semitic stereotypes such had been used in the notorious Nazi propaganda film Jüd Süß, and that this transgression overruled the constitutional freedom of artistic expression.

While the campaign against Krugman does seem to have aspects of ‘reopening the hunting season,’ the perpetrators have been very careful to avoid any overt anti-Semitism (it is of course no secret that Krugman is Jewish). However, anyone intimately familiar with German sensitivities cannot help but recognize that Piper’s article is skating dangerously close to this kind of historical stereotyping, particularly by using the term “Hasskampagne gegen Deutschland” (“hate campaign against Germany”). I won’t even speculate on who is responsible for the Stürmer-like “Volkswirt mit Schaum vor dem Mund” (“economist foaming at the mouth”), which was carefully placed outside the body of Piper’s article (and thus cannot be directly attributed to him) but in a prominent position on the webpage, and appears as the article’s actual title—which it is not—in Google searches.

Wednesday, July 15, 2015

O tempora o mores! Whether as creditors or debtors, German economists always seem to be angry!

The professor of financial accountability Jacob Soll is just back from a conference in Munich on Greek sovereign debt, and he shares his thoughts on “Germany’s Destructive Anger” with us today in the New York Times.

What are Germans angry about? According to Soll:

But when the German economists spoke at the final session, a completely different tone took over the room. Within the economic theories and numbers came a moral message: The Germans were honest dupes and the Greeks corrupt, unreliable and incompetent. Both parties were reduced to caricatures of themselves. We’ve heard this story throughout the negotiations, but in that room, it was clear how much resentment shapes the views of German economists.

Now flash back to 1919, when economist, founder of the German Workers' Party-DAP (predecessor of the German National Socialist Party) and theoretical mentor to the still-unknown Adolf Hitler Gottfried Feder published his pamphlet Das Manifest zur Brechung der Zinsknechtschaft des Geldes (Manifesto on the Breaking of Debt Enslavement):

Zinsknechtschaft

Economists sure knew how to make attractive book covers in 1919. Take notice for your next book on the Greek debt crisis, Hans-Werner Sinn!

Feder attributed all the evils of the modern world to the machinations of financial capital (particularly, of course, Jewish financial capital) and the existence of interest on debt. He inspired the Nazi distinction between productive capital (schaffendes Kapital) and parasitic capital (raffendes Kapital, i.e., banking, stock market speculation), and wanted to do away with the latter by replacing traditional money with “Feder-Giro” money (not to be confused with his contemporary Silvio Gesell’s “Freigeld”).

While he was a big influence on Hitler and Goebbels during the 1920s, when the Nazis actually came to power in 1933 after the Machtergreifung, they reappointed former Reichsbank president Hjalmar Schacht (who had resigned in 1929 because he found the American Young Plan to service Germany’s debt unsustainable—sound familiar?) to the central bank presidency and as minister of economics, sidelining Feder completely. And of course the banks were not abolished (only the Jewish bankers).

Schacht writes about Feder in his memoir Magie des Geldes (The Magic of Money), Düsseldorf/Vienna, 1966, p. 66 (my translation):

The National Socialist propaganda under the direction of Gottfried Feder virulently attacked our entire private capitalistic banking and monetary system. Its slogans were nationalization of banks, breaking of debt slavery, and the introduction of “Feder-Giro” money with the intention of completely destroying our system of money and banking. In order to deflect this nonsense, as Reichsbank president I appointed  a committee of inquiry to draw up proposals for tighter supervision and regulation of banks [...] During several consultations with Hitler I managed to get him to break with the absurd and dangerous banking and monetary ideas of his party comrade.

Evidently, what one thinks about “Zinsknechtschaft” and the unsustainability of debt very much depends on whether one is a creditor or a debtor. Keynes, of course, thought that both should share in the costs of debt restructuring, in the interests of advancing the common good rather than descending into a negative-sum game of vengeance and counterproductive austerity. During the Bretton Woods negotiations he wanted to penalize equally countries that ran current-account deficits and surpluses. The Americans (at least until the Marshall Plan), who in 1944 were the world’s creditors and the world’s trade surplus champions, would have none of this. Evidently the Germans, who today in their part of the world are in a similar position, seem to share this view. They are in no rush to give up their 10%-of-GDP export surpluses for any corrupt, unreliable and incompetent Greeks.

Soll concludes his German anger article with this recommendation to them:

When the panel split up, German attendees circled me to explain how the Greeks were robbing the Germans. They did not want to be victims anymore. While I certainly accepted their economic points and, indeed, the point that European Union member countries owe Germany so much money that more defaults could sink Germany, it was hard, in Munich at least, to see the Germans as true victims.

Here lies a major cultural disconnect, and also a risk for the Germans. For it seems that their sense of victimization has made them lose their cool, both in negotiations and in their economic assessments. If the Germans are going to lead Europe, they can’t do it as victims.

My recommendation to German economists if they want to get their anger under control (for, as we’ve seen, they seem to have major problems in both roles):

Neither a borrower nor a lender be!

(Hamlet Act 1, scene 3)

And my admonition to Greek Rosencrantz and Guildenstern economists:

The rich ruleth over the poor, and the borrower is slave to the lender.

(Proverbs 22:7)